Jim Davis

This discussion is to promote safety and not to establish liability.

CAA’s report contains padding, repetition and inaccuracies so in the interest of clarity, I have paraphrased extensively.

Aircraft registration:                            ZS-IWV

Owner                                                 Brian & Wynand Investments

Date and time of accident:                 15 September 2013

Type of aircraft:                                  Piper PA-32-300

Type of operation:                               Private flight

PIC license type:                                Commercial

License valid:                                      Yes

PIC age:                                              22

PIC total hours:                                   237

PIC hours on type                              3.1

Last point of departure:                      Ranch Hotel, S of Polokwane

Next point of intended landing:          Krugersdorp

Location of accident site:                   N1 highway 14 nm SW of FAPP  

Meteorological information:               020°/9 kt 30ºC Viz 3 km hz

POB:                                                   1+2

People injured:                                    0

People killed:                                      0

Synopsis:

The pilot and two passengers flew from Krugersdorp to the Ranch Hotel that morning and stayed for lunch. The tanks were full at the start and the flight took 1hr 50 mins.

The pilot said that after lunch he did a preflight inspection and they taxied to the threshold of Runway 06 where he selected the right main tank and performed the pre-takeoff checks.

After takeoff the aircraft climbed steadily to approximately 300 ft. The pilot then noticed a slight loss in power and assumed it to be fuel related. He did not take any immediate action, claiming “it wasn’t critical as yet”. A few seconds later he noticed a dramatic loss in power, so he switched to the left main tank and richened the mixture fully. He then lowered the nose to initiate a glide. The engine had stopped and the propeller was windmilling. 

He elected to land on the N1 highway as there was very little traffic. While on the glide to land he had to raise the nose to clear the power lines. He then pushed the nose down to prevent a stall. The engine regained full power just above the surface, however the pilot felt it was too late as the aircraft was too low and slow for a full recovery and he had no other option but to continue with the landing.

The aircraft touched down hard in a nose-down, right-wing-low attitude, which caused the nose and right main landing gear struts to break off. It then veered to the right towards oncoming traffic. The right wing hit a safety barrier and the aircraft bounced back towards the centre of the highway. It came to rest approximately 25 m further on.

The aircraft was correctly maintained, the C of G was within limits and it was nearly 500 lbs below gross. The engine teardown examination did not reveal any evidence that a mechanical malfunction could have caused it to have lost power or stopped.

The damage to the propeller displayed evidence that the engine was delivering power in the high range while the aircraft skidded over the road surface. This evidence was consistent with the pilot’s report that “the engine came alive” seconds prior to ground impact.  

According to the pilot the engine power loss and subsequent engine stoppage lasted approximately 10 to 15 seconds. It is believed that this was due to an interrupted fuel supply to the engine. A vapour lock within the fuel system could not be excluded. Full engine power was restored seconds before the forced landing on the road after the pilot changed the fuel tank selector to another tank. This confirmed that the engine power loss/stoppage was most likely due to an interruption of fuel supply.

Following the engine stoppage, the pilot opted to turn left in order to set up the glide for the forced landing on the highway in a south-westerly direction. This resulted in a tailwind component, which would have reduced the aircraft’s glide distance slightly (sic).

Jim’s comments:

This poor guy had very little time tosort himself out – that’s why an EFATO is known to be such a killer.

In fact the aviation world is still reeling from the death of AOPA’s boss, Richard McSpadden, who died in a C177 Cardinal at the beginning of October 2023 following an EFATO.

This is unbelievably ironic because I have watched two videos of his on the subject of the “impossible turn”. He has collected a considerable amount of info on the subject, and he stresses that it is indeed a viable option under the right circumstances. In fact the one video showed four different types of aircraft attempting it, and only one – the Bonanza – failed to get back to the field. 

Of course he does stress that the success of a turn-back is dependent on the a number of variables:

  • The aircraft’s climb performance
  • The aircraft’s glide performance
  • The pilot’s proficiency
  • The pilot’s recent practice of the turn back
  • The wind
  • The runway length
  • Other traffic
  • The landing options ahead.

And so on.

I’m not saying that the Saratoga pilot did indeed attempt to turn back to the field – but it does look like that. He had fairly non-threatening territory ahead. In fact a 20° turn to the right would have lined him up nicely on the highway. Or perhaps an even better option would have been the less used road parallel to the highway.

Instead, I believe he instinctively ripped the aircraft round into a 180° turn to the left only to find that that part of the highway had power lines crossing it.

This is what happens when you are hit with a sudden problem and you have no time to think it through.

But actually he did have plenty of time to think it through – plenty of time – on the ground before takeoff.

I’m not sure how to say this with humility – so I will have to do it without the requisite H. I am something of an expert on EFATOs – I’ve had at least four – possibly more, and they mostly don’t stick in the turnip because they were all non-events. Not a scratch on any aircraft. The reason they were all boringly unexciting is that I was always prepared for them. In some cases with good reason, because they were test flights.

If your instructor says to you, “I’m going to give you a simulated engine failure soon after takeoff, and I want you to use the speed, field, fuel, flap procedure,” then it’s all going to go pretty smoothly.

So why not say that to yourself before every takeoff? It will reduce the startle factor and reaction time to almost zero and you swing into a well proven routine:

Speed – immediately lower the nose

Field – select the best available

Fuel – change tanks and pump on (usually)

Flaps – as required. Full before touchdown.

By the way, I have seen and discussed many procedures for an EFATO. This is an airforce one, and it’s by far the best. Notice that there are no silly rules about only turning x°. You turn towards the best available field – that means the best one you can glide to – allowing for the turn – so it’s entirely a matter of height and airspeed.

Forget what the pilot claims – he is not on trial – he’s simply an example of what could happen. Bear in mind that we are all inclined to try and make ourselves look good after an accident. I’m not saying this guy massaged the facts – but he might have done.

We can just use this as a learning tool to show what should have happened if we were in his shoes, and wide awake, and properly prepared.

I must break off here to tell you how deeply ingrained this self-defence mechanism, and adjusting the facts, is.

About a hundred years ago I put my Tiger Moth on its back, during takeoff at Wonderboom. Actually I didn’t – my unlicenced mate did – but I was in the aircraft and was therefore PIC.

The first person at the scene of devastation was Barry Radley – the boss of the DCA. After he pulled me out of the smouldering wreckage he asked me what had happened. This was easy – I didn’t need to think about it – the brakes jammed – and that’s what I told him – knowing it was the truth. But of course a Tiger doesn’t have brakes – I knew that, and so did Barry – but I stuck to my story until eventually I realised that it was nonsense.

What I’m getting at is that inventing a self-defence story is normal and intuitive.

This guy tells us that he lined up on the road – saw the power lines, flew over them and landed hard. I don’t think so. I suspect he ran out of airspeed trying to clear the wires, stalled and crashed – with substantial damage. Nothing wrong with that.

But if someone had said to him, you are going to have an EFATO – what’s your plan? – he would have done a gentle turn to the right and landed safely on the highway, or the parallel road, or amongst the scrubby bush.

I’m going out on a limb here, but the engine stoppage sounds like it may have been pilot induced. The selector on OFF would have given him roughly time for takeoff and climb to 300’. His changing of tanks and the engine resuming power a few seconds later would fit well with this scenario.

Take home stuff:

  • When an engine stops, throttle fully back immediately. Then you know exactly where you stand and are going to get no nasty surprises. This engine was developing full power throughout the crash sequence.
  • EFATOs are so dangerous mostly because we don’t have time to work out a plan of action. But actually, we do. We have stacks of time before each flight, so plan and practice EFATOs while you have the time.