Darren Olivier
In an era of growing instability and broad reinvestment in military capabilities, driven by the re-emergence of great power competition, separatist movements, and increased pressure for resource competition as a result of climate change, the ongoing destruction of the South African Air Force (SAAF) and its capabilities is both inexplicable and extremely dangerous. The implications of this decline will be felt for decades.
That the SAAF is struggling is not news: I have often covered the falling availability of the SAAF’s fleet and the sharp reduction in flying hours, largely as a result of large budget cuts and problems at Denel, and there have been many similar reports in both mainstream and specialist media.
However, a recent Parliamentary answer, by Defence Minister Thandi Modise, shows that what was once a crisis is now a full-blown disaster, with the SAAF achieving a readiness rate of just 20% at the time the question was asked. This is not just a fleeting setback but a manifestation of deep-rooted structural issues that compromise national security in an era of complex global threats.
What makes this situation particularly alarming is the intersection of multiple factors contributing to this decline. It’s not just a story of ageing fleets, but rather a narrative of chronic underfunding, strategic mismanagement, and a lack of political will that has been simmering beneath the surface for years. I have consistently highlighted the need for robust and adaptive military, yet affordable, capabilities in the face of evolving security challenges. In this light, the current state of the SAAF is more than a tactical deficiency; it is a strategic miscalculation with far-reaching implications.
As we delve into the issue, it’s crucial to look not only at the immediate operational impacts, but also the broader strategic consequences for South Africa’s defence posture. The grounding of such a significant portion of the air fleet raises serious questions about the country’s ability to respond to regional conflicts, participate in peacekeeping operations, and even secure its own airspace.
This column aims to dissect these issues, drawing on a range of insights and data, to understand how one of Africa’s most significant air forces finds itself in this precarious position and what steps can be taken to navigate out of this turbulence.
First, it’s important to note that availability figures are a point in time measurement and will vary somewhat from day to day as aircraft enter and leave maintenance. It’s not, as commonly understood by many of the general public, that only 20% of the SAAF’s aircraft will ever be able to fly again. As an example, while only two Gripens were available at the time the data was compiled, a few weeks later three flew down to Overberg Air Force Base for a weapons camp. So it should be understood that there will always be some variance in these numbers.
However, there is sufficient evidence that these are persistent problems, as the average level of availability has steadily decreased every year since the late 2000s. In hindsight a high point for the peacetime SAAF, and the number of allocated flying hours budgeted for the force, has declined from more than 40,000 a year to a paltry 12,000, which it may not even able to meet as it has flown just 3,462 in the first half of the year.
Worse, the trend is accelerating and unless something is done urgently to correct the course, either by providing additional funding or by intentionally cutting capabilities to save other capabilities, it’s quite likely that availability will drop to 10% or lower before long.
Only 1 out of 6 remaining C-130BZ Hercules aircraft, crucial for transport and logistical support, is serviceable. This situation might be helped somewhat by a R1 billion injection of funding from the Treasury to allow for minor upgrades by Marshall Aerospace, an accelerated maintenance programme, and engine overhauls, but more is needed.
The situation is even more dire for the Gripen jet fighters, the backbone of SAAF’s air defence, with only 3 out of 26 serviceable as ongoing administrative and funding issues hinder their return to service after a year long grounding caused by the inability of Armscor and the SAAF to conclude a service agreement with Saab and GKN. The Hawks of 85 Combat Flying School that provide training for prospective fighter pilots are not doing any better, with only 3 of 24 currently serviceable.
The entire fleet of 8 C-47TP, 8 Cessna Caravan, and 4 King Air aircraft, integral for various utility roles, is grounded. Moreover, the Oryx helicopters, the backbone of the SAAF, have an availability rate of just 12% with only 5 serviceable helicopters available. They have been severely affected by the ongoing collapse of Denel, which has all but lost its ability to support the SAAF’s aircraft as a result of mismanagement and corruption. At least 12 aircraft currently awaiting rebuilds and other major maintenance.
Only 6 A109s are available, and while 3 Rooivalks were available at the time of the report, the availability of that fleet has been so badly affected by Denel’s issues that there is a dire shortage of qualified crews. And just 1 C-212, 1 Bk117, 2 SuperLynx 300s, and 6 of the crucial PC-7 MkIIs used for basic flying training are available. Only the VIP fleet is relatively unaffected.
This situation not only limits the SAAF’s tactical and strategic capabilities, but also raises serious concerns about its ability to fulfil its national and regional obligations, especially crucial with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) involved in a crucial mission against Islamist insurgents in Mozambique and soon likely to be a part of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The lack of serviceability affects a broad spectrum of operations, from routine surveillance and patrol missions to critical training and readiness exercises.
So how did we get here? In short, from years of non-serious government policy on defence, starting from treating the SANDF as a barely necessary department whose budget should be raided for other needs while continually increasing the burden of missions placed upon it, and continuing with a half-hearted and ineffective approach to defence policy and management and a complete lack of urgency when dealing with what was a crisis years in the making. The complete lack of any serious interest in halting the decline, beyond commissioning, agreeing to, and then ignoring a defence review in 2015 from successive administrations has been bewildering to say the least.
The SAAF’s budget has been cut dramatically in real times over the decades, even as the cost of many of its inputs, such as fuel and spare parts, have skyrocketed as a result of exchange rate changes and inflation. It’s at the point where the total amount allocated to the force is now less than that allocated to a single fighter squadron in the USAF. Of course, USAF fighter squadrons are uniquely expensive for a variety of reasons, and South Africa has cheaper labour costs, but that’s still an astounding statistic.
It’s not only about the money though, and there are other factors that are also just as severely affecting the force. For instance Denel, which was the primary maintainer of many SAAF aircraft, was effectively destroyed first by the corruption of state capture and then the incompetent indifference of the Department of Public Enterprise which starved it of funds, guidance, leadership, and even timely approvals for restructurings and other requests.
Armscor has in turn reportedly imposed ever more severe Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) requirements on aircraft support and spares contracts, even in cases where no local supplier could reasonably perform the work. While there is widespread agreement on the need for redress, it should not come at the expense of national security and it should be used to develop actual indigenous industrial and technological capabilities, rather than enriching middlemen and brokers who do little more than act as intermediaries between the SAAF and the foreign OEM.
The best time to act to save the SAAF was ten years ago, but if urgent action is taken now, the bulk of its capabilities can still be preserved. It won’t be an easy road, though, and it won’t be cheap. It’s simply not possible to run a force of more than 200 aircraft and 9 bases on the current allocation, no matter how efficient or lean you can make the SAAF. So either the budget needs to increase or some squadrons and/or bases need to be closed. And unless funding is provided for crucial capital acquisitions, the ageing fleet will become increasingly difficult to maintain. However, with South Africa’s economic crisis it’s unlikely there can be any such substantial increase in funding.
I believe the time has therefore come for a new defence review, one with a bold, uncomfortable, and uncompromising mission to critically re-examine the role of the South African Air Force over the next 20-30 years, to agree with National Treasury on some minimum level of funding for the next decade, to focus on retaining and rebuilding its key capabilities, and to completely overhaul the force and its structures to make it as efficient and lean as possible and oriented toward operational effectiveness as its primary metric. It’s not going to be a pleasant process, because it will require making difficult choices about which capabilities and bases to keep and which to cut, but it’s better to do that intentionally when it can be done with the least disruption than by letting it happen through unmanaged d